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Introduction 
In the Venn diagram of identities and practices, there is clearly an overlap between 
academic and activist.  Many academics are not activists; most activists are not academics.  
But a significant number of people have dual roles.  Feminist thinkers have bridged the gap 
between activism and academia; so have LGBTI scholars; so have post-colonial and anti-
racist thinkers and doers.  Most of these movements and ways of thinking have abandoned 
the historic split between the personal and the political, or the public and the private.  Partly 
this is because the personal is political.  If you are spending your working hours thinking 
through oppression and resistance to it, you are not likely to be someone who never does 
joins a protest, never writes a letter of complaint, never organises for a better world, let 
alone someone who lives an unequal or exploitative life.  To do less would be hypocrisy.  So 
disability scholars and campaigners are wheeling a path made easier by the efforts and 
activities of others.  
Engaged scholars have sought consistency in their thinking and their positions.  They want 
to put their politics where their profession is.  Which raises a question of how to reconcile 
these two identities or practices.  Are they separate?  That is to say, does the academic work 
nine to five each week day, and the activist come out at night and weekends?  Are they 
different activities, requiring different positions and possibly contradictory?  Or, like Marx’s 
romantic picture in the German Ideology, are they all part of the whole?  Some of us tend to 
write about what we know: the gay scholar who lives a gay life and writes about sexuality; 
the feminist who seeks a personal as well as a professional transformation of gender 
relations; the disability scholar who writes about bodies and minds that differ from the 
norm and who seeks to change perceptions nd practices in the public domain. 
But an activist academic or an academic activist is not just the person who goes from the 
protest to the lecture room or library.  There are also those who go the other way, or rather 
who move from the faculty into the public forum.  They are academic activists.  So this 
paper will consider this move also, because otherwise I am only problematizing activism, 
and not academia itself, which seems to me easy and wrong. 
So, in this paper, I explore this debate in the most personal terms, and without apology.  
First, I give my own story.  Then I explore questions of how people think through bioethics 
issues, speaking of both academics and lay people.  Next, I consider the particular 
obligations which those of us who claim to be intellectuals may lay ourselves open to.  
Finally, I say something about disability bioethics. 
 
Mea culpa 
I came into thinking and writing about prenatal diagnosis and selective termination and 
genetics from a commitment to disability rights, and from personal experience of having an 
inherited impairment.  At the time of my early advocacy, and then my first academic paper 
in 1995, I had two young children with achondroplasia, the condition I had inherited from 
my own father.  To me, life as a disabled person was positive, and we were equally valid to 
non-disabled people.   In 1988, when my partner had been pregnant with Ivy, we had come 
up against obstetricians who advised us to have diagnosis and termination if the pregnancy 
was affected by achondroplasia.   We also encountered eugenic thinking from family 
members and friends.  My concern was that prenatal screening and selective termination 
were an assault on viability of disabled people and their right to exist.   
Between 1989 – 1994, I was writing my doctoral thesis, exploring ways of thinking about 
disability, drawing on many different areas of sociology, political thought and cultural 
analysis, and trying to make links to feminist thinking and that of other liberation struggles.  
So in the time period I am discussing here, I was a fledgling academic, exploring what it all 
meant.   I had originally started my PhD not because I wanted to be an academic but 
because I wanted to write a book about disability, which I wanted to call The Politics of 
Physical Difference: I ended up with a doctorate, but no book. 
In 1995/1996, I authored a Channel 4 television documentary with the director Sarah 
Boston – who herself had personal experience of having a son with Down syndrome who 
sad.   Our film, Ivy’s Genes, looked at the issue of prenatal diagnosis through the eyes of Ivy, 
then eight years old.  In the film, I drew comparisons with eugenics. 
But as part of the film, and to achieve more balance, I was asked to do an interview with 
Professor John Burn, a clinical geneticist wo was head of the Northern Genetics Service.  
John had thought a lot about these issues too, and was a very good doctor with a strong 
commitment to his patients.  He challenged me to think about the doctors and scientists 
who worked for his service, but above all, the women who were asking for, and receiving, 
prenatal diagnosis, some of whom were making difficult decisions to have terminations of 
wanted pregnancies.   This was a perspective that until then I had not made space for in my 
thinking – although I did support a woman’s right to choose.  So as a result of spending time 
with John and his colleagues, I had to let go of this idea that doctors were all directive, that 
their thinking was eugenic, that they were part of a programme to eliminate disability. 
Around this time, too, a colleague of mine quietly told me about a mutual friend, a woman 
who had become pregnant at the age of 40.  She had received a diagnosis of Down 
syndrome.  She and her older husband, who had been positive about the pregnancy, 
reluctantly felt that they did not have the emotional resources and were too old to parent a 
child with Down syndrome, and reached the very difficult decision to have a termination.   I 
could see the logic of their thinking.  I could not describe it as eugenic.  More importantly, I 
worried about the documentary and the public statements I had made, and the papers I had 
published: would someone like her, seeing this material, feel worse about the decision she 
had made?  That was not my intention.  Indeed, I felt strongly that I did not have the right to 
tell people that they were wrong.  Perhaps partly this was because my training was as a 
sociologist, not an ethicist.    We are socialised to look at systems and structures.  We are 
not always as comfortable looking at individual actions.  And we are not trained to make 
normative statements about these actions: we shy away from those judgements.  Although 
often we are happily critical about representations, or discourses, or social programmes. 
A third thing that happened around this time was that I had more encounters with moral 
philosophers and bioethicists.  I debated with John Harris, Jonathan Glover, Julian Savulescu 
and others in Britain and Australia.  I would go on to meet Dan Brock and David Wasserman 
and colleagues in America.  I read about the non-identity problem.  I realised that my 
position on prenatal diagnosis and selective termination – and indeed, that of activists in 
general – concealed contradictions, inconsistencies and other problems of logic.  If I 
presented it in debate with the bioethicists, I would easily be defeated. 
As a result of all these experiences, exposures and thinking, I moved away from the strong 
activist position I had first espoused.  I developed a more nuanced analysis.  I focused more 
on the context in which screening took place – the lack of balanced information, the risk of 
directiveness, the way that the screening offer was staged, like a conveyor belt, so that 
women and men ended up in a place which they may not have chosen at the start.  I was 
still critical of the practice of prenatal diagnosis, but I was much more careful about my 
language, and the analogies I was drawing, and what it was that I was criticising.    
In a sense, this was like the journey I went on around theories of disability and the social 
model.  When I started my PhD in 1988, I was very excited about disability rights and the 
politics of disability.  But the more I thought, the more I became disillusioned with the social 
model of disability.  When Michael Oliver’s book, The Politics of Disablement, came out in 
1990, I was as critical as I was enthusiastic.  When Jenny Morris’ book, Pride Against 
Prejudice, was published in 1991, I was much more enthusiastic, and wrote the one and only 
fan letter I have ever sent to a researcher.  I ended up having a more nuanced and critical 
position on models of disability, which led to the revisionist article that Nick Watson and I 
wrote in 2001 (which was rejected by the leading disability studies academic journal on 
what we believed were ideological grounds) and then to Disability Rights and Wrongs in 
2006. This marked a break with the social model orthodoxy of the dominant materialist 
approach to disability studies (Shakespeare, 2014).  It also made me unpopular with my 
former allies. 
Thinking of bioethics, at a personal level, I still felt drawn to working on genetics.  I was 
having health problems, and commuting to Leeds was too difficult.  And I had had big 
clashes with Colin Barnes, whose position seemed to be orthodox Marxism and 
endorsement of the UPIAS social model position.    
For these three reasons, I jumped at the opportunity of being the first employee of the 
Policy, Ethics and Life Sciences Research Institute (the acronym PEALS was John Burn’s brain 
wave) at the International Centre for Life, in Newcastle.   The International Centre for Life, 
which I had written a critical article about of back in 1997, was the brainchild of Alastair 
Balls and Linda Conlon, late of the Tyne and Wear Development Corporation.  It brought 
together a science visitor centre; the NHS Northern Genetics Service and the regional IVF 
service; commercial enterprises in biosciences.  Alastair was keen for there to be a bioethics 
component to complete the multi-disciplinary picture, and hence PEALS came into being, 
and I began work in October 1999. 
This was not a popular move.  Local disability rights activists – associated with Disability 
Action North East, an organisation I had founded with Stuart Bracking in 1992 – daubed 
swastikas on the billboards outside the building, and the slogan “No Nazi eugenics”.  When I 
took the job, the Disability Now newspaper quoted activists accusing me of selling out, of 
compromising my principles for the sake of a cushy job.  An article in Coalition, the 
magazine of the Greater Manchester Coalition of Disabled People – the ideological 
heartland of the disability rights movement – accused me of supporting eugenics, and of 
being no better than Peter Singer, the notorious utilitarian bioethicist and hate figure for 
the disability community. 
Being attacked by people who I had always regarded as my friends was very hurtful, and the 
unfairness of the language and the comparisons drawn stung.  I was used to having 
supporters in the disability community, who cheered speeches and comedy routines. Now I 
had detractors, critics, haters even.  I realised that there was a cost when you abandoned a 
clear cut, polarised position.  You lost your constituency, your people disowned you. It was a 
lonely place, to be critical of the social model and to be thoughtful about all the 
perspectives in prenatal diagnosis. Ironically, by the end of the 1990s, I felt closer to the 
philosophers than to activists.   But I was not one thing or another: too nuanced to be an 
activist, not sufficiently well argued to be a philosopher. 
I may not have pleased disability rights activists with my position, but I do not think I had 
retreated into my ivory tower (or Sir Terry Farrell-designed Millennnum Commission-funded 
white elephant by the Tyne).   My public engagement included policy work.  Around this 
time, I was briefly a member of the Antenatal Sub Group of the NHS National Screening 
Committee, and I remember arguing strongly in terms of the target of the screening 
programme being the number of women who made an informed decision, not the number 
of women who terminated their pregnancy.   My work also included patient education.  
While at PEALS, I received a grant from the Wellcome Trust to create a website to give 
women and men balanced information about Down syndrome and other conditions which 
were tested for during pregnancy.  So I tried to put my intellectual work into practice, albeit 
differently to have the disability rights community may have preferred, but perhaps more 
constructively. 
Later on, I would go through a similar process with another key issue in bioethics, assisted 
dying.  The disability rights movement have been uniformly opposed.  But I thought about it 
extensively, and read arguments and evidence.   I felt that the disability rights movement 
were not being consistent.  The political principle of choice and control was central to the 
independent living movement’s thinking.  So why would this be abandoned at the end of 
life?  If someone was terminally ill, and wished to have assistance to die, why was this 
choice the only one that the disability rights community would not endorse?  The idea that 
this decision was taken because of lack of support to live independently in the community 
did not seem relevant.  Independent living and personal assistance was hardly relevant to 
someone in the end stages of cancer or motor neurone disease.  Moreover, I looked at the 
data on what ordinary disabled people – not activists but the person in the street – thought 
about assisted dying.  This suggested that, like the non-disabled public, there were a range 
of positions. Disabled people were similar to non-disabled people – in opinion polls, the 
majority supported the right to assisted dying, within carefully regulated parameters.  This 
became my position, and lead to more disagreements with the disability rights movement.  
Ironically, the one other prominent activist who took a public stance in support of assisted 
dying was the very same individual  who had written the unpleasant piece in Coalition 
magazine accusing me of being like Peter Singer. 
This time around, there were limits to my public stance on assisted dying.  The pressure 
group Dignity in Dying asked me to be a patron of their disability caucus, an invitation which 
I refused.  While I was happy to speak out in support of assisted dying (in limited 
circumstances) and to write articles and participate in debates, I did not want to be so 
closely associated with another unpopular (to disability rights activsts) position.  It gets 
exhausting always to be defending oneself, and to be regarded as a traitor by your natural 
constituency.  Perhaps this could be regarded as cowardice. 
 
Ways of thinking, ways of knowing 
In trying to consider what it meant to be an academic, and why this meant taking positions 
in opposition to the disability rights movement, I found the work of the psychologist 
Jonathan Haidt very appealing, when I was introduced to it by Jackie Leach Scully.  In what 
he himself calls his most important paper (Haidt 2001), he looks at the rational and the 
intuitive, and distinguishes between two ways in which people think.   The first is our image 
of thinking.  He describes the judge, who explores all the evidence, and weighs it up 
carefully, before coming to her opinion.  The second is our more likely practice of thinking.  
He describes the barrister, who knows the position he wants to adopt in advance, and then 
selects the evidence to support his intuitions.  Most lay people, Haidt argues, are more like 
barristers and judges.  We have biases, we don’t want to shift our position when new 
evidence comes to like, we are stubborn in our prejudices. 
I think this descriptive analysis is similar to, but different from, R.M.Hare’s two-level 
utilitarianism, which distinguishes between everyday intutition and special case critical 
deliberation (Hare 1981), although it has some similarities, and the ‘thinking fast/thinking 
slow’ model that Amos Tvesrky and Daniel Kahnemann developed (Kahnemann 2011)  
As an academic, and without being appallingly pompous, I think my duty is to be a judge.  If 
new evidence or argument comes to light, which is irreconcilable with my current position, 
but nonetheless robust, then I have to change my position.  Otherwise I am not being 
faithful to my duty, which is an honest and open commitment to the truth, or at least, the 
closest I can come to truth at any moment. 
An activist does not have this responsibility.  It may be useful for her to take a hard-line 
position, because it shocks others into reconsidering their own positions.  She may want to 
generalise, rather than talking in detail.  She will probably need some slogans, preferably 
short enough to fit onto a placard or tee-shirt.  She will certainly want to motivate people, 
inspiring them to fight injustice.  For all of this, simplicity is useful, complexity is not.  
Dichotomies are useful, multiple stakeholders are not.  Clarity is vital, nuance is not. 
So we have to consider whether, at any one time, we are being judges or barristers: will we 
strive for what is true, even if it is inconvenient, or for what is supportive of a political 
position?   Politics can suborn rationality.  People want to hold a position, even if it is not 
supported by evidence and argument.  But intellectual honesty takes you away from rigidity, 
away from certainty, into grey areas, and might take you into areas which are unpopular.  I 
remember encountering this issue when I first started challenging the social model of 
disability, in the early 1990s.  I was with a political friend, who was out in public promoting 
this dichotomous, simple, easy to understand account of disability.  Later, we were back at 
his house, and discussing our aches and pains, as happens when two or more disabled 
friends get together.   I asked him something like: how come you can support the social 
model, and deny that disability has anything to do with impairment, given that you admit 
that all these issues are important in your life?  And he replied that different contexts and 
different audiences demanded different responses: he saw no contradiction between the 
two positions that he held.  But for me, perhaps because my primary persona was an 
academic, while his primary persona was as an activist and community organiser, it was vital 
that I could hold positions that were consistent and as truthful to the world as I understood 
it as possible. 
Of course, some activists aspire to, and mainly achieve, the judge-like position; some 
academics consciously or unconsciously end up as barristers.  And others take up different 
positions regarding the evidence and arguments at different times and on different topics. It 
usually does not matter, if you are a barrister and end up being a judge: in the real world, 
some barristers do end up on the judicial bench (I believe it would be wonderful if more 
activists were judges, and I feel our politics would go better if they were).  But in the real 
world, judges do not go back to being barristers.  The metaphor is telling us something here.  
If one is going to set oneself up as a judge, have to be very sure that one has all the 
information and has weighed it appropriately.   This claim to truth is serious and significant 
matter.   
I believe that some academic bioethicists believe they are being judges, but are actually 
being barristers.  They have a set of intuitions, and they construct papers which apply those 
intuitions to different topics, drawing on their philosophical training to give the reasons and 
arguments which those intuitions require to become intellectually robust positions, rather 
than mere prejudices. 
Of course, some academics have a more complex account of truth than my simple model 
here.  They might scoff at my naivete. If they are relativist or believe that truth is a socially 
constructed concept, or have some other slippery or contingent notion, perhaps they do not 
have these dilemmas, and can reconcile their different positions without losing sleep.  But I 
am not one of those academics. 
There have been multiple times when I got it wrong, when I discovered new facts about the 
world, or understood new arguments, and those have always been shaming moments for 
me: I feel I should have known this already.  How could I opine as an academic, when I did 
not know that about disability?  This is particularly difficult, because unlike many academics, 
I talk about more topics than just my particular area of expertise.  I go on public radio or a 
current affairs programme, and answer questions about art and religion and politics, which 
have nothing to do with disability and on which I am not qualified to speak as an academic.  
I think at this point I am being a public intellectual.  I am still doing my best to be as accurate 
as I know how, but my words should not be given much more credence than those of other 
folks.  Only on my specialist subject should I be thought judge-like. 
My career has been one of an activist who becomes more and more engaged in academic 
topics, who becomes a qualified sociologist, but at the same time becomes more 
philosophically literate, and then shares what he has learned with his constituency.   Unlike 
my work as a sociologist, I am not expecting to make significant contributions to bioethics, 
let alone moral philosophy.  In ethics, my primary audience is people equally untrained in 
philosophy.  By writing and speaking publicly, I have tried to raise the tone of the debate in 
activist circles and among the wider public.  I have challenged what I see as inconsistencies 
and other failures of logic in what otherwise might seem very appealing and resonant 
positions.  I want activists to become better at what they do, to refine their arguments and 
focus their attacks.  Some of the things they might think are problematic, I think are less 
worrying.  Other issues that are not problematized, I would like to challenge.   
However, I would like to say that as an activist turned bioethicist, I  do have something to 
contribute to bioethics debate.  So what might that be?  I have lived experience which I am 
willing to think about, and share explicitly.  I was born with one impairment 
(achondroplasia) and acquired another (spinal cord injury) in my forties.  So I know 
something about whether impairment is identity-affecting, and in what ways (Edwards).  I 
also know what these impairments are like, although it is always possible that mine is a 
unique and unrepresentative experience:  I can supplement my subjective expertise by 
experience by knowledge of the wider social and psychological research on these 
conditions, some of which I have generated. (Shakespeare et al 2010).  I have had two 
children, each of whom shares my genetic condition, so I understand at first-hand what it is 
like to have a diagnosis in pregnancy, and the pressures to which that exposes you – from 
clinicians, from lay people.  I have had a partner who had a termination on the grounds of 
foetal anomaly.  I have had a partner who has undergone assisted conception. I have 
supported several people with terminal illness.  Throughout my life, I have had friends with 
Down syndrome, and have personally supported children and supported adults with the 
condition.  In other words, I have expertise from experience, as well as academic expertise. 
Jackie Leach Scully (2008) talks about “disability bioethics”, the particular perspectives 
which someone with lived experience as well as academic training can bring.  Perhaps, like 
her, I epitomize that.  Most philosophers or bioethicists or social scientists or policy-makers 
have experienced some of what I have just described: they have had abortions and had 
children, they have been relatives or friends of people with disabilities, they have supported 
people at the end of life.  So my life experience here is far from unique.  The only dimension 
that is different is our lived experience of disability, which most philosophers or bioethics or 
policy-makers tend not to have had, because disabled people remain largely excluded from 
these debates, at the highest level.  The person, like Scully Adrienne Asch or myself, who 
combines academic training, knowledge of bioethics, and lived experience is rare.   
This means that at best, my papers on bioethical themes, however idiosyncratic, may have 
perspectives which are useful, in combining expertise by experience with some academic 
expertise.  Or else, more worryingly, perhaps I know enough philosophy to be damaging, 
and retain enough activist, to make trouble: in other words, the worst of both worlds.  But 
more than publications, perhaps my contribution best lies in the public sphere.  So when I 
chair a Nuffield Council on Bioethics enquiry, or make a television documentary, or speak to 
a Minister or a parliamentary select committee, I can bring a distinctive combination of 
knowledge and experience, which may be more refined and accurate than either the 
academic or the activist, and may also have greater rhetorical power.  I join the ranks of the 
engaged academics, whom we might also call activist academics. 
 
Philosophical expertise and public debate 
The activist-academic is a common role, particularly in bioethics. Many bioethicists and 
philosophers have contributed to public policy debate.  They may have sat on, or even 
chaired, government enquiries (on various topics of law reform, or inquiries into abuses) or 
advisory deliberations (such as Nuffield Council on Bioethics or Hastings Center).  They may 
have contributed to public education in various ways (talking in the media, talking in 
schools, talking at café scientifiques, writing for popular readers).   Their motivations for 
these activities may be various, and not always benign: not just raising the tone of the 
debate, or even resolving complex problems of bioethics or political philosophy in the real 
world,, but also feeling the satisfaction of being a public figure or wielding power.  
There is a very small literature on the activist-philosopher.  One debate is the question of 
whether someone can have moral expertise, and what that might consist of.  Moreno 
(2006), 706) suggests that moral expertise is something to which we should aspire.  It 
consists of knowledge of general principles and moral theories; together with thinking skills; 
together with a refusal to take the easy way out.   In particular this last issue supports my 
claim about bioethicists being judges above.  Dan Brock says something similar: 
“Truth is the central virtue of scholarly work.  Scholars are taught to follow 
arguments and evidence where they lead without regard for the social 
consequences of doing so” (Brock 2006, 715) 
Yet just as freedom of speech does not include shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theatre, so 
there is a requirement of caution when it comes to saying everything that could be said 
about a topic.   Brock points out that when a bioethicist is working in the public arena, she 
should be thinking about the impact of her words, not just the truth claims she is making. 
“… persons who directly participate in the formation of public policy would be 
irresponsible if they did not focus their concerns on how their actions will affect 
policy and how that policy will in turn affect people.” (Brock 2006, 716) 
So in the world of policy and practice, there are useful fudges that avoid worse outcomes: 
Brock gives the example of the distinction between killing and letting die.  One could argue 
that acts and omissions with the same consequences are morally the same, but this might 
lead to worse outcomes in the world of clinical medicine. 
Brock concludes that academic bioethicists should participate in public policy, but should be 
prepare to take limited and temporary positions which may be incompatible with their 
wider intellectual agendas.   If the bioethicist is to have an impact, he needs to hedge and 
trim somewhat – as opposed to what he might say in a university seminar – in order not to 
be rejected as eccentric or appalling.  The point of participation in policy is to persuade non-
academics of a position, not to maintain the pious and pure position of integrity and truth. 
To understand some of the benefits and dangers of activist-philosophers, next I want to 
outline, as I perceive them, some of the main varieties of activist-philosopher.  These are 
ideal types, illustrated with reference to some individuals who perhaps epitomise the type. 
First, there is the hyper-liberal.  Almost everyone, in Britain at least, is liberal to some 
extent.  We support freedom of speech, we are pluralist when it comes to religion, we want 
to be agnostic about how people live their lives, as long as they do not infringe the rights of 
others.  But our polity also has certain ideas about what activities are better than others.  
We want to limit people’s freedoms in various ways: we wish them to wear seat belts, we 
do not want them to buy sex, we want them to eat better. In the past, governments 
imposed some of these preferences via the law: abortion and homosexuality and 
pornography were banned or censored to improve public morality.  Now we leave many of 
these choices up to individuals.  So our polity has become more liberal, but not perfectly 
liberal.  The philosopher as hyper-liberal acts to brush aside the remaining shreds of 
paternalism, pointing out inconsistencies in regulation.  For example, I believe Jonathan 
Woolf played this role on the Gambling Review Body (2000-2001) which recommended 
deregulation of the gambling industry and which led to the New Labour government 
creating one of the most liberal environment for gambling in the world.   By 2015, nearly 
two thirds of Britons had gambled in the previous year; and nearly 4% could be classified as 
“at risk” gamblers (Conolly et al 2017).  This means there were 400,000 problem gamblers in 
Britain, and another half million who gambled dangerously.  To his credit, Woolf has been a 
trustee of the Responsible Gambling Trust for many years.  
 
Second, there is the utilitarian iconoclast.  In a way, he is the extreme case of the hyper-
liberal, who ends up being a libertarian who challenges everyday thinking.  He operates as a 
controversialist, saying the unsayable, and jolting us out of our convictions.  He pushes our 
everyday intuitions to the extremes, or goes to the extremes to show us that our everyday 
intuitions are wrong.  This is the world of Julian Savulescu or John Harris or Peter Singer.  
Sitting on commissions or writing for lay readers, this philosopher has dedicated followers, 
but may not change public opinion as a whole.   The utilitarian philosopher is particularly 
enraging to disabled people, because he legitimises prenatal diagnosis and other measures 
which seem threatening to those with disabilities; at the most extreme, he argues for 
euthanasia of newborns. 
 
Third, there is the philosopher as oligarch.  She takes her great technical prowess and goes 
to sit amongst the mighty, where she is as respected as she is In academic circles.  She chairs 
parliamentary committees and public bodies.  She moves beyond her area of professional 
expertise and talks about other topics of public policy, applying her toolkit of philosophical 
expertise wherever possible.  She distrusts the media and the level of public debate: 
sometimes she seems to scorn lay people themselves.  Her way of making a difference is to 
speak to the elites, and to become one of the elite.  Mary Warnock or Onora O’Neil, or in 
earlier generation Isaiah Berlin, are examples of this tendency. 
Fourth, there is the philosopher as radical.  She is more humble than the oligarch.  She uses 
philosophical thinking to deconstruct taken for granted assumptions – like the utilitarian, 
but not sharing the arid and narrow consequentialist calculus.  She may not have allegiance 
to a single moral theory, by which all topics can be answered.  She is less systematic, more 
provisional in her analysis.   Like the hyper liberal, indeed like all these types, she clarifies 
areas of confusion, points out inconsistencies, deconstructs taken-for-granted assumptions.  
But she also turns her spotlight on, or applies her chisel to,  other philosophers, and shows 
up their limitations or mistakes in their work.  I think Bernard Williams often operated in 
this way.  Mary Midgeley is someone who always has always done this:  she has spoken  
truth to power, challenging the scientists or business people who may otherwise operate 
unchallenged in the public arena.   
There are undoubtedly other varieties of activist philosopher, and no doubt this typology 
should be refined and further sub-divided.  It will be clear from my characterisation that I 
am partial.    I have worked alongside and debated with all these types, and I think some are 
more useful, and some are more dangerous than others.  Perhaps all these roles are 
necessary, and do some good in some circumstances.  But I worry about the damage that 
the less humble varieties of academic philosopher can do.  Perhaps they worry about the 
damage that my own insufficiently humble academic activist-ethicist might do, or has done.  
I would say that probably each of the ideal-types of academic activist philosopher can do a 
different type of damage in the public realm. 
The more publicly esteemed the philosopher is, the more worrying I think them.  I believe 
that questions of public policy are too complex to be left to moral philosophers.  And I think 
moral philosophy is not always the most helpful tool for public policy makers.  This is a huge 
topic, on which I only have space to say a couple of things, which have been said before, and 
may seem obvious anyway.  But it seems helpful regularly to remind people of them, 
particularly philosophers themselves. 
One obvious reason informing my thinking is that most moral questions do not have one 
answer.   Otherwise moral philosophy would have ended by now.  Instead, there are 
competing perspectives, and different arguments which can be given different weights.  So 
the answer that Peter Singer gives to a public policy dilemma would usually be different to 
the answer that Michael Sandel might give.  To listen to one and to ignore the other might 
be dangerous.  They both have something to contribute, but it is not immediately obvious to 
a neutral party that one should be preferred on all questions. 
But more widely than that, another difficulty is that moral expertise is not the only relevant 
expertise.  Mostly public policy is about real people and what they should do, which relates 
to what they might do and could do and do do.  Philosophy is not a universal multi-tool.  We 
requires a bigger toolbox than simply philosophy (I was trying to think about whether the 
best simile was of philosophy as an awl or a hammer or a razor, but you can add your own 
analogy here).   
So, given that many philosophers deploy consequentialist arguments, then some empirical 
knowledge of what might result from particular policy configurations would appear prima 
facie helpful.  So, social or political research or expertise should supplement the normative 
reasoning.   Economists often typify what groups of people get up to.  All of these social 
scientists can help us understand how complex systems work. 
The social world is not just about consequences and power and social relations and 
processes. It is also about meanings and beliefs and practices.   When I want to understand 
those questions, I turn to an anthropologist, who has expertise in how different cultures 
operate on these terms.  Sociologists and anthropologist can give insight into  the wider 
cultural and social framework – the power and the meanings.   The social world, at base, is 
about what real people actual do, as individuals or in crowds.  So, a psychologist is required 
to understand how individuals think and how they might behave.   
Without drawing on, or working with, all these different types of expertise, then the 
philosopher is not going to be a very good guide.  In particular, the work of psychologists 
Daniel Kahmeman and Amos Tversky (summarised in Kahneman 2011) reminds us that 
individuals and groups do not behave as rationally and coherently as either the philosopher 
would hope, or the economist would assume: their thinking displays biases and  is subject to 
fallacies. 
 
Interests and identities 
The word “interest” might be helpful here, because of its different usages in the English 
language.  A philosopher, like any intellectual, is interested in many different topics.  And 
public policy, in particular, is very interesting.  It is interesting to deploy philosophical 
thinking as a contribution to these interesting questions.  If an intellectual was uninterested 
in participating in public debate, it would seem at least a shame, and at worst, irresponsible 
in someone who work is usually supported , to a greater or lesser extent, with public 
money. 
But individuals are not always disinterested, neutral observers, despite the claim of some 
philosophers to be able to take the perspective of an archangel (Hare, 1981).  People may 
have a stake in a things.  These interests are usually obvious, if they are properly declared.  
People may be being paid, or at least wined and dined, by one or other player in the 
controversy in question.  Sometimes, this means they should recuse themselves.  
Sometimes, they become compromised.  Occasionally, an academic becomes guilty of 
corrupt practices. 
Sometimes, an intellectual has an interest because of an ideological or religious position.  
For example, here I should declare an interest: I am a Quaker.  For me, this means I am 
opposed to gambling, because I consider it profiting from another person’s loss and I see 
that as immoral: I do not play the National Lottery, or engage in any other gambling.    But I 
am inconsistent, because I have helped allocate funding from the National Lottery Charities 
Board and also from the Big Lottery Fund-supported DRILL programme.  Separately,  I have 
been involved with successful (and unsuccessful) applications to the Big Lottery Fund, as a 
researcher or as trustee of a voluntary organisation.  So I am compromised in the debate on 
gambling, in various ways.  
Sometimes, a philosopher or other intellectual has personal interests because it is a debate 
on disability and they have an impairment themselves or are the relative of someone else 
who has an impairment.   Sometimes their impairment makes no difference to their 
thinking.  But sometimes it makes a considerable difference.  Disability can make the work 
of a bioethicist more useful, insightful, original and necessary.  This is where Jackie Leach 
Scully  (2008) talks about disability bioethics – the different standpoint and viewpoint that a 
disabled person who is also a bioethicist – or vice versa – can bring: 
“doing this means working from people’s experience of disability to see if and how it 
colors their perceptions, interpretations, and judgements of what is going on in 
moral issues, especially in moral issues that have direct relevance to disability and 
where differences in experiences of disability might be expected to have weight.” 
(Scully, 2008, 1 
But the ways in which disability makes a difference are complex, because disability is a 
multi-dimensional, scalar concept, which depends heavily on the wider context 
(Shakespeare, 2006).   The experience of being a disabled person is multiple.  It may be 
about having a particular diagnosis (e.g. MS) or a consequent functional limitation – being 
unable to walk or hear well.  It may be about the cultural stigma or discrimination that often 
accompanies the limitation: society regards people with mental health conditions, In 
particular, in often prejudicial ways.  It may be about the social barriers that one faces: the 
hearing loop that does not work, the lack of a ramp or elevator.  It may be about the lack of 
social opportunities: the lack of health insurance, or employment.  The experience of 
disability is the result of the interaction between the person with the health condition, and 
the wider social and cultural context.  Therefore, just because a bioethicist is diagnosed with 
diabetes or a heart condition does not immediately make them disabled, or a disabled 
bioethicist.  But perhaps if they live long enough, and experience enough, they might 
become one. 
So, there is not one disability bioethics: there is a range.  It would be greatly mistaken to try 
and read off ethical opinions from states of embodiment.  For example, some people, who 
are close to people with genetic conditions, reject screening as disloyal or they believe a 
condition not to be incompatible with the good life.  Others, who have seen the effects of 
genetic conditions, wish to avoid having a baby affected by that condition.  Two people with 
the same impairment or illness may have a very different attitude to the ethical questions 
which biomedical interventions raise. 
For example, attitudes towards prenatal testing for Spinal Muscular Atrophy (SMA)  held by 
adults with the condition have  been found to be linked to the severity of the symptoms 
they experience and time of symptom onset (Boardman, Young and Griffiths 2017). In a 
survey of over 80 individuals with SMA the majority were in favour of prenatal genetic 
screening for the condition.  However, those with early onset SMA and more severe 
symptoms were less supportive of prenatal testing than those with late onset and milder 
symptoms. The group with the more severe types of SMA also viewed their experiences of 
disability more positively than those who had experienced life as a non-disabled person or 
had less significant symptoms. Individuals with relatively static impairments present from 
birth tend to adjust better to their condition and identify with it in comparison with those 
who have experienced an alternative life ‘before disability’ or experience periods of decline 
and change – being disabled is not an identity they want (Shakespeare 2006).  For this 
group, prenatal testing is not viewed as a rejection of disabled people, rather a rejection of 
the negative aspects associated with impairment.   This points to how a genetic condition or 
impairment is not always ‘identity affecting’, particularly if it has not been congenital 
(Edwards 1999). 
However, this nuanced and heterogenous approach to the relations between impairment 
status (or genetic status) and bioethical position is not evident in all the approaches to 
disability bioethics.   I have written elsewhere of what I consider to be the more toxic impact 
of identity or minority group politics (Shakespeare 2013), following the critique of Nancy 
Fraser.   Identity politics does play a very important role in mobilising a movement, and 
empowering individuals (Charlton).  But I think that a misleading analogy is often made 
between gender, ethnicity and sexuality, on the one foot, and impairment, on the other.    
First, the evidence is that many people with impairments – perhaps 50% of people who 
would be considered to be disabled – do not identify as such.  In other words, the salience 
of disability to personal identity differs.  Impairments and other health conditions are not 
always identity-affecting (Edwards 1999).   
 
Second, whereas gender, ethnicity and sexuality are almost always only problematic where 
social stigmatisation or discrimination makes life more difficult for people in the subaltern 
categories.  That is to say, they are socially created problems.  However, impairment and 
illness are almost always problematic, to some extent, and sometimes to a very great 
extent.  As with gender, ethnicity and sexuality, society imposes a burden which makes 
everything more difficult – people are indeed disabled by society.  But in the case of 
disability, many people are also disabled by their differences of body or mind.  So 
impairment/disability is not necessarily something to be celebrated, there may be good 
reasons to try to prevent the onset of impairment, and it is understandable that some 
people take steps to detect impairments in the womb, and to terminate affected 
pregnancies.  Not a move that everyone wants to make, and something that should always 
be a matter of personal conscience, within the parameters of the law, but a very different 
category of action to those that are directed against fetuses that are found to be female, for 
example. 
 
However, as so often, my viewpoint here is controversial, and rejected by many within 
disability studies.   So that means many people, activists and academics within the 
standpoint of disability identity politics, contest and oppose prenatal diagnosis and selective 
abortion.   Even though most would support a woman’s right to choose, there are 
suggestions that fetal characteristics should be a prohibited ground for termination: in other 
words, women can choose not to be pregnant, but not choose what fetus to be pregnant 
with.   
 
Conclusions 
I welcome the contribution of activists to bioethics, and think there should be more space 
for different voices.   In particular, we need to hear the diverse voices of disabled people. 
We need more disabled people to have the training – whether in social science or in 
philosophy – to be able to take part in these debates.  This is not necessarily about growing 
new cohorts of disabled academics – although that would be useful – but it could be about 
giving basic bioethics grounding to activists, so that more could participate confidently in 
debates, such as Peter Singer’s famous debate with Harriet McBride Johnson. 
I think bioethicists need also to be educated, whether by activists or by social scientists does 
not matter.  They need to hear testimony about everyday lives of disabled people, so that 
their approaches reflect lived reality, not some imagined fantasy of what disability is like.  
For example, there is strong evidence that disabled people have a good quality of life.  A 
good bioethicist would have researched this, so her ethical claims are rooted in empirical 
evidence, even if she does not gather that evidence herself. 
I think we should be aware that just as there are multiple bioethicists with a range of views 
– not all bioethicists are Utilitarians or libertarians, only the loudest ones – so disabled 
people have a range of views on topics such as prenatal diagnosis and assisted suicide 
(Garland-Thompson 2012).  We need to ensure all views are heard, not only those which 
accord with the current outlook of the disability rights movement.  There are multiple 
disability bioethics.  And some disabled people will do philosophy in a different way entirely 
(Carel).  All are to be welcomed. 
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